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Standing to Sue in the Myriad Genetics 
Case 
Megan M. La Belle∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
A short time ago, a three-judge panel of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued its decision in Ass’n for Molecular 
Pathology v. USPTO (Myriad Genetics),1 one of the most important patent 
cases in recent history.  The Myriad case addresses the controversial question 
whether isolated human genes related to breast and ovarian cancer can be 
patented.  The case has garnered significant attention from various industries, 
the Department of Justice, the legal academy, the media, and the public.  
Features on the lawsuit have appeared in the New York Times, Washington 
Post, Wall Street Journal, and Los Angeles Times,2 and approximately forty 
amicus briefs were filed with the court.  So far, commentators and amici have 
 
∗ Assistant Professor, Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law.  The author 
would like to thank David Orlic and Amanda Leiter for their valuable comments and suggestions.  The 
author is also grateful to her research assistants, Chanelle Blackie and Josh Goyden, for their excellent 
research and editorial assistance.     
1. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO (Myriad), 653 F.3d 1329 (2011).  A recording of 
the oral argument is available on the Federal Circuit’s website. See Oral Argument, Ass’n for 
Molecular Pathology v. USPTO (Myriad), 653 F.3d 1329 (2011) (No. 2010-1406), available at 
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oral-argument-recordings/2010-1406/alla. 
2. Andrew Pollack, Ruling Upholds Gene Patent in Cancer Test, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2011), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/01/AR2010030102925.html; Kari 
Lydersen, Lawsuit Attacks Patent Giving Company Control Over Genetic Test for Cancer Risk, 
WASH. POST (Mar. 2, 2010), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/03/01/AR2010030102925_pf.html; 
Nathan Koppel, Genetic Research Spurs Fight Over Patents Tied to the Body, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 10, 
2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB126041358100284931.html; Eryn Brown, Myriad Genetics: Is 
it Legal to Patent a Gene?, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/apr/04/news/la-
heb-gene-patent-myriad-20110404.   
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focused primarily on the substantive legal issues: Should genes be patentable 
subject matter?  How do gene patents impact medical research and health care?  
Do gene patents promote innovation as required by the Constitution?  Yet, the 
Myriad case also raises important questions about the justiciability of patent 
declaratory judgment disputes that have received surprisingly little attention. 
The patents at issue in Myriad cover the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, 
which relate to an increased risk of breast and ovarian cancer.  Twenty named 
plaintiffs – including various medical organizations, genetics researchers, 
clinicians, and cancer patients – filed a declaratory judgment action against the 
patent owner, Myriad Genetics (“Myriad”), and several other defendants.3  
Plaintiffs sought a declaration that the patents were invalid because human 
genes, as products of nature, are not patentable subject matter.  After 
determining that all twenty plaintiffs had standing, the district court declared 
the patents invalid and granted summary judgment to plaintiffs. 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed that there was standing to sue, 
although on far narrower grounds.  The Federal Circuit held that only one of 
the twenty plaintiffs – Dr. Harry Ostrer – had suffered an injury-in-fact, a 
prerequisite for standing in federal court.4  In the court’s opinion, the other 
plaintiffs lacked standing either because Myriad had taken no actions against 
them, or because their injuries were too speculative to satisfy the imminent 
injury requirement under Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.5 
Having decided that the case was justiciable, the Federal Circuit turned to 
the merits.  In a divided opinion, the court reversed the lower court’s invalidity 
ruling, holding that at least some of Myriad’s patent claims recite patentable 
subject matter.6  The court held, in other words, that some types of genes can be 
patented.  After the Myriad court issued its decision, both parties petitioned for 
panel rehearing. Recently, the panel denied both petitions.7 
The panel’s decision may not be the end of the line for the Myriad case, 
however.  The plaintiffs (and perhaps Myriad) could choose to file a petition 
for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court.8  Because of the 
importance of both the substantive and procedural issues at stake, there is a 
 
3. Complaint at ¶¶ 7–26, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO (Myriad), 653 F.3d 1329 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011).  (No. 09-4515).   
4. Myriad, 653 F.3d at 1344. 
5. See id. at 1346–47 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992)). 
6. Id. at 1354. 
7. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Disposition Sheet (Sept. 13, 2011), 
http://www.genomicslawreport.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/Myriad-Dispositions.pdf. 
8. Andrew Pollack, Despite Gene Patent Victory, Myriad Genetics Faces Challenges, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 24, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/25/business/despite-gene-patent-victory-
myriad-genetics-faces-challenges.html?pagewanted=all (stating that plaintiffs are considering seeking 
Supreme Court review).  The parties have ninety days from the date the petition for rehearing was 
denied to file a petition for writ of certiorari.  See SUP. CT. R. 13.1, 13.3.  The plaintiffs’ petition for 
rehearing was denied on September 13 and Myriad’s was denied on September 16, which means that 
their certiorari petitions would be due in mid-December. Id.      
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1868615
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good chance the Supreme Court will weigh in on this case.9  Yet, even if 
Myriad does not reach the Supreme Court, the decision has potentially far-
reaching implications for patent declaratory judgment actions that warrant 
closer attention. 
This Essay argues that the Myriad court misinterpreted and misapplied 
Supreme Court standing precedent, fashioned a test that is far too narrow, and 
wrongly concluded that Dr. Ostrer was the only plaintiff with standing to sue.  
The Essay begins with a brief explanation of standing in the patent declaratory 
judgment context, focusing on the Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.10  It then provides a background of the 
Myriad case, highlighting those facts which were relevant to the court’s 
justiciability determination. 
The next Part of the Essay turns to the Myriad decision and discusses the 
court’s flawed standing analysis. The Myriad court initially identified 
MedImmune’s “all the circumstances” test as the relevant standard,11 but then 
proceeded to apply a bright-line rule instead.  The court held that in order for an 
alleged infringer to have standing in patent declaratory judgment actions the 
plaintiff must demonstrate both (i) affirmative acts by the defendant, and (ii) 
meaningful preparation for infringing activity by the plaintiff.  Applying this 
two-part test (instead of MedImmune’s holistic standard), the court erroneously 
concluded that Dr. Ostrer was the only plaintiff with standing. 
After examining the opinion in Myriad, the Essay avers that the Federal 
Circuit has come full circle since MedImmune and is once again taking a 
formalistic approach to standing in patent declaratory judgment actions.  In 
MedImmune, the Supreme Court continued its long-standing practice of 
adopting flexible legal standards that facilitate lawsuits brought by parties 
challenging patent validity.12  The Supreme Court encourages such lawsuits 
because of the public benefit created when potentially bad patents – like those 
at issue in Myriad – are eradicated.13  Rather than following the Supreme 
Court’s lead, however, the Federal Circuit has made it more difficult for 
plaintiffs to challenge potentially invalid patents by heightening standing 
 
9. Kevin E. Noonan, Deciphering the Patent Eligibility Message in Prometheus, Myriad, and 
Classen, Patent Docs (Sept. 20, 2011), http://www.patentdocs.org/2011/09/deciphering-the-patent-
eligibility-message-in-prometheus-myriad-and-classen.html (noting that Supreme Court may consider 
Myriad); Dennis Crouch, Patentable Subject Matter and the Supreme Court Myriad Preview (Aug. 3, 
2011), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/08/patentable-subject-matter.html (discussing potential 
Supreme Court review of Myriad). 
10. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007). 
11. Myriad, 653 F.3d at 1342–43. 
12. See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 345 (1971) 
(discussing line of Supreme Court cases that “eliminate[ed] obstacles to suit by those disposed to 
challenge the validity of a patent”).  
13. See, e.g., id. at 331 n.21 (“It is just as important that a good patent be ultimately upheld as 
that a bad one be definitively stricken.”); Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969) (explaining 
the importance of validity challenges in light of the “public interest in permitting full and free 
competition in the use of ideas which are in reality a part of the public domain”). 
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requirements.  Thus, the standing test announced in Myriad not only violates 
the letter and spirit of MedImmune, but it also undermines the primary purpose 
of the patent system: promotion of innovation to benefit the public.  Had 
standing been analyzed under MedImmune’s all the circumstances test, the 
Myriad court would have concluded that at least two other plaintiffs – Drs. 
Kazazian and Ganguly – also had standing to bring this case. 
The Essay then argues that the Myriad court’s reliance on Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife14 to support its narrow interpretation of the standing 
doctrine was misplaced because Lujan and Myriad are distinguishable.  Most 
importantly, the plaintiffs in Lujan had not yet suffered an actual injury when 
they filed suit, but complained only of a possible future injury.  This is in 
contradistinction to Myriad where Drs. Kazazian, Ganguly, and Ostrer had all 
suffered an actual injury as a result of defendant’s conduct.  Specifically, these 
three plaintiffs were forced by Myriad to cease BRCA testing, and they 
continued to suffer from those injuries at the time the lawsuit was filed. 
The Essay concludes by underscoring the importance of declaratory 
judgment actions to our patent system.  Under our current patent system, 
litigation is the primary gatekeeper of patent quality.15  When patent owners 
choose not to sue for patent infringement, a declaratory judgment action is 
often the only way to challenge a patent’s validity.  If patents are successfully 
challenged, previously patented innovations may then be used and exploited by 
the public.  The result is enhanced consumer choice, increased competition, and 
lower costs, all of which bring significant economic benefits to society.16  Thus, 
courts should be moving toward legal standards that encourage, rather than 
dissuade, the filing of suits like Myriad.  If given the opportunity, the Supreme 
Court should review Myriad in order to get the Federal Circuit back on course 
with respect to standing in patent declaratory judgment actions. 
 
 
14. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
15. On September 16, 2011, President Obama signed into law the Leahy-Smith America 
Invents Act (“AIA”), the most significant amendment to our patent laws since 1952. Leahy-Smith 
America Invents Act, Pub. L. 112-029, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).  Among other things, the AIA provides 
for certain post-grant review proceedings to challenge patent validity at the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office (USPTO), rather than in federal court.  Id. § 6, 125 Stat. 284, 299–313.  However, these post-
grant review provisions do not become effective until September 16, 2012.  Id. § 35, 125 Stat. 284, 
341.  Moreover, the ability to challenge patent validity through these administrative proceedings will 
be more limited than in federal court.  See, e.g., id. § 6, 125 Stat. 284, 306 (providing that petition for 
post-grant review must be filed within nine months of the date of the grant of the patent or issuance of 
reissue patent).  Thus, the extent to which these new procedures will impact patent validity challenges 
remains unclear.   
16. MedImmune, LLC v. PDL BioPharma, Inc., No. C 08-5590 JF (HRL), 2011 WL 61191, at 
* 23 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2011) (noting that “the public benefits from [potentially invalid] patents being 
challenged”). 
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I. 
STANDING IN PATENT DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTIONS 
A. The Doctrine of Standing 
Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution limits the judicial power of 
the United States to “cases” and “controversies.”17  Courts have long 
recognized that various justiciability doctrines derive from this provision, 
including the requirement that plaintiffs have standing to sue in federal court.18  
One purpose of the standing doctrine is to ensure that federal courts resolve 
only genuine controversies between adverse parties, since Article III prohibits 
the issuance of advisory opinions.  Another more controversial role served by 
the standing doctrine is to maintain the separation of powers among the three 
branches of our federal government.19 
The Supreme Court has established that “the irreducible constitutional 
minimum of standing contains three elements.”20  First, the plaintiff must have 
suffered, or been threatened with, an injury-in-fact.  An injury-in-fact is a 
concrete and particularized invasion of a legally protected interest; it must be 
“actual or imminent,” as opposed to “conjectural or hypothetical.”21  Second, 
there must be a causal connection between the injury and the defendant’s 
conduct, meaning at least some portion of the plaintiff’s injury is “fairly 
traceable” to the defendant and not to a third party.22  Lastly, it must be likely 
that the relief requested will redress the plaintiff’s injury.23  At least one 
plaintiff must satisfy all three of these standing requirements to proceed in an 
Article III court in any type of suit,24 including those brought under the 
Declaratory Judgment Act.25  
 
B. The Declaratory Judgment Act and Patents 
The Declaratory Judgment Act, enacted in 1934, provides that “[i]n a case 
of actual controversy within its jurisdiction . . . any court of the United States, 
upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other 
 
17. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
18. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1148–49 (2009). 
19. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan?  Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and 
Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 215–20 (1992). 
20. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.  
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. at 561. 
24. Horne v. Flores, 129 S. Ct. 2579, 2592 (2009) (“[I]n all standing inquiries, the critical 
question is whether at least one petitioner has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the 
controversy as to warrant his invocation of federal-court jurisdiction.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
25. The Supreme Court has also identified three prudential standing principles: (i) plaintiff 
generally may not assert rights of a third party; (ii) taxpayer plaintiff may not sue regarding a common 
grievance; and (iii) plaintiff’s claim must be within the “zone of interests” of the relevant statute.  See 
Erwin Chemerinsky, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 61 (5th ed. 2007).  Since these requirements were not at 
issue in Myriad, they will not be addressed further in this Essay.  
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legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration. . . .”26  The Act 
further provides that “[a]ny such declaration shall have the force and effect of a 
final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such.”27 
The Supreme Court consistently has held that the Declaratory Judgment 
Act is “procedural only.”28  So, like most procedural devices, the Declaratory 
Judgment Act is trans-substantive, meaning it is available in any type of federal 
litigation regardless of the substantive nature of the underlying claims.29 And, 
indeed, plaintiffs have invoked the Declaratory Judgment Act in a wide range 
of civil suits over the years, including cases involving First Amendment claims, 
contractual disputes, and antitrust matters, to name just a few.30 
From the beginning, though, the Declaratory Judgment Act and patents 
have been closely linked.  The legislative history makes clear that, in deciding 
to pass the Declaratory Judgment Act, Congress was particularly concerned 
with the rights of alleged patent infringers who had been threatened with suit, 
but were unable to ask a court to determine their rights.31  Professor Edson R. 
Sunderland, a proponent of the Act, testified before Congress about the plight 
of alleged patent infringers: 
I assert that I have a right to use a certain patent.  What am I going to 
do about it?  There is no way I can litigate my right, which I claim, to 
use that device, except by going ahead and using it, and you [the patent 
holder] can sit back as long as you please and let me run up just as 
high a bill of damages as you wish to have me run up, and then you 
may sue me for the damages, and I am ruined, having acted all the time 
in good faith and on my best judgment, but having no way in the world 
to find out whether I had a right to use that device or not.32 
This scenario has been described alternatively as a patent owner’s use of a 
“scarecrow” patent,33 or a patent owner’s engagement in “a danse macabre, 
brandishing a Damoclean threat with a sheathed sword.”34 
Since its enactment, the Declaratory Judgment Act has played an 
important role in patent cases, both because it protects alleged infringers from 
this danse macabre, and because it allows alleged infringers to challenge 
invalid patents.  When an alleged infringer sues for declaratory relief and 
proves that a patent is invalid, society as a whole benefits because that 
 
26. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2006).   
27. Id. 
28. See, e.g., Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671 (1950). 
29. See H.R. Report No. 366, 112th Cong. (2011), to accompany H.R. 5623, 70th Cong. 
(1928). 
30. See, e.g., North Side Lumber Co. v. Block, 474 U.S. 931 (1985); Schneider v. Smith, 390 
U.S. 17 (1968); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959). 
31. See Declaratory Judgments: Hearings on H.R. 5623 Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 70th Cong. 16 (1928). 
32. Id. at 35. 
33. Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int’l, Inc., 508 US. 83, 95–96 (1993). 
34. Id.  
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previously protected intellectual property enters the public domain.35  Indeed, 
the Supreme Court has long acknowledged the public function served by these 
patent declaratory judgment actions, and it consistently has adopted legal 
standards to facilitate such lawsuits.  The most recent case in this 
jurisprudential line, MedImmune v. Genentech, addressed standing in patent 
declaratory judgment actions – the very question at issue in the Myriad case. 
C. MedImmune v. Genentech 
Standing problems arise in all types of cases, but they are much more 
common in cases where the plaintiff seeks an anticipatory remedy – meaning 
an injunction or declaratory relief – rather than damages.  Thus, the very nature 
of patent declaratory judgment actions, where the plaintiff seeks only a 
declaration of rights and not monetary damages, makes them fertile ground for 
standing challenges. 
In patent declaratory relief suits, the alleged infringer sues the patent 
owner and seeks a declaration from the court that its products do not infringe 
the patent and/or that the patent at issue is invalid.  Often the alleged infringer 
files its lawsuit before it has engaged in any activity that might be considered 
infringing.  Under these circumstances, it can be quite difficult for plaintiffs to 
establish the first two elements of the standing inquiry: (1) an injury-in-fact (2) 
fairly traceable to the defendant patent owner’s conduct.36 
Since the Federal Circuit was created in 1982, it has struggled to define 
the parameters for standing in patent declaratory relief actions.37  While the 
court has consistently held that “[t]he mere existence of a potentially adverse 
patent” is insufficient for standing, it is much less clear what circumstances 
permit alleged infringers to sue for declaratory relief.38  Yet, when the Federal 
Circuit has attempted to provide more structure to the standing analysis, the 
Supreme Court has rebuked its efforts. 
For many years, the Federal Circuit required alleged patent infringers to 
satisfy a two-part test to establish standing in a declaratory relief action: (i) the 
alleged infringer must have had a reasonable apprehension of suit at the time it 
filed the action; and (ii) the alleged infringer must have produced, or made 
meaningful preparations to produce, an allegedly infringing product.39  The 
 
35. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ, of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 345 (1971) (holding 
that “all ideas in general circulation [should] be dedicated to the common good unless protected by a 
valid patent”). 
36. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc. 549 U.S. 118, 128 n.8 (2007) (“The justiciability 
problem that arises, when the party seeking declaratory relief is himself preventing the complained-of 
injury from occurring, can be described in terms of standing (whether plaintiff is threatened with 
‘imminent’ injury in fact ‘fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant”)).   
37. Standing in this context is often referred to as “declaratory judgment jurisdiction.” See, e.g., 
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO (Myriad), 653 F.3d 1329, 1334 (2011).   
38. See, e.g., Capo, Inc. v. Dioptics Med. Prods., Inc., 387 F.3d 1352, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2004); 
BP Chems. Ltd. v. Union Carbide Corp., 4 F.3d 975, 978 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
39. See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. Amoco Corp., 970 F.2d 885, 887 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
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“reasonable apprehension” prong of this test required alleged infringers to show 
either an “explicit threat” or some other conduct by the patent holder that 
created an objectively reasonable apprehension of an infringement suit.40  The 
“meaningful preparations” prong, on the other hand, focused on the alleged 
infringer’s conduct.  This second prong was intended to preclude plaintiffs 
from seeking advisory opinions on whether “some merely contemplated 
activity” might be infringing.41 
In Gen-Probe v. Vysis,42 the Federal Circuit applied this two-part test in 
deciding whether a non-repudiating licensee could sue for declaratory relief.  
Although Gen-Probe’s production of an allegedly infringing product clearly 
satisfied the second prong, the court concluded that plaintiff lacked standing 
based on the reasonable apprehension portion of the test.  The court reasoned 
that a non-repudiating licensee does not have a reasonable apprehension of suit 
because the patent holder cannot sue the licensee for infringement since the 
conduct is permitted under the license.43  Thus, after Gen-Probe, in order for a 
licensee in good standing to seek declaratory relief, it needed to breach the 
license agreement (for example by ceasing royalty payments), so as to create a 
reasonable apprehension of suit. 
The Gen-Probe rule reached the Supreme Court a few years later in 
MedImmune v. Genentech.44  In an eight-to-one decision, the Court reversed the 
Federal Circuit and held that Article III’s standing requirement does not 
obligate a non-repudiating licensee to terminate or breach its license agreement 
before seeking a declaratory judgment.45 The licensee should not have to “bet 
the farm, so to speak, by taking the violative action.”46 
The Court instructed, instead, that the question of standing in declaratory 
judgment actions be determined on a case-by-case basis in light of all the facts.  
Specifically, the inquiry should be “whether the facts alleged, under all the 
circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties 
having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant 
the issuance of a declaratory judgment.”47  In other words, in deciding whether 
plaintiffs have established the elements of standing – injury-in-fact, causation, 
and redressability – the court must look to the totality of the circumstances. 
While the parameters of this test will continue to evolve, there is 
consensus among courts, commentators, and litigants that the MedImmune 
standard for establishing standing is significantly more lenient and favorable to 
alleged patent infringers.48  Indeed, when measured against this new standard, 
 
40. BP Chems., 4 F.3d at 978. 
41. Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 736 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
42. Gen-Probe v. Vysis, 359 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
43. Id. at 1382. 
44. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007).  
45. MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 137.  
46. Id. at 129. 
47. Id. at 127. 
48. See, e.g., Prasco, LLC v. Medicis Pharmaceutical Corp., 537 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2008); 
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the Supreme Court concluded in MedImmune itself that standing had been 
established.49 
But MedImmune did more than announce a new standard for standing in 
declaratory relief actions.  The Court also criticized the reasonable 
apprehension prong of the Federal Circuit’s standing test, stating that it 
appeared to conflict with Supreme Court precedent.50 Initially, the Federal 
Circuit responded to MedImmune by abandoning the reasonable apprehension 
prong, and stating that it would use the all the circumstances test instead.51  
More recently, however, the Federal Circuit has taken a different tack.  In 
Prasco, LLC v. Medicis Pharmaceutical Corp., for example, the court held that 
“proving a reasonable apprehension of suit is one of multiple ways that a 
declaratory judgment plaintiff can satisfy the more general all-the-
circumstances test to establish that an action presents a justiciable Article III 
controversy.”52 
Similarly, in Cat Tech LLC v. Tubemaster, Inc.,53 the Federal Circuit 
considered MedImmune’s impact on the meaningful preparations prong of its 
now-repudiated two-prong test.  The court began by acknowledging that 
MedImmune altered the standing analysis in patent declaratory relief actions 
and made it easier for plaintiffs to establish an Article III case or controversy.  
Nevertheless, the court opined, the question of meaningful preparations 
remains an “important element” in the standing analysis.54 
It is against this legal backdrop that the Federal Circuit decided that only 
one of the plaintiffs in Myriad had standing to sue for declaratory relief.  The 
court’s standing analysis will be taken up in Part III.  In order to frame the 
issues, however, the next Part provides a brief factual and procedural 
background of the case. 
II. 
BACKGROUND OF MYRIAD GENETICS 
A. Factual Background 
Myriad, a for-profit healthcare company, studies the role of genes in 
human disease and develops diagnostic tests for diseases found to have a 
genetic basis.  Myriad is the co-owner or exclusive licensee of several patents 
related to two human genes known as BRCA1 and BRCA2 (collectively 
 
Ronald A. Bleeker & Michael V. O’Shaughnessy, One Year After MedImmune – The Impact on 
Patent Licensing and Negotiation, 17 FED. CIR. B.J. 401, 435 (2008) (stating that “[t]he new standard . 
. . makes it easier for accused infringers to bring a declaratory judgment action”). 
49. MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 137. 
50. Id. at 132 n.11.  
51. SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Teva 
Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp., 482 F.3d 1330, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2007).   
52. Prasco, 537 F.3d at 1336. 
53. Cat Tech LLC v. Tubemaster, Inc., 528 F.3d 871 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
54. Id. at 880. 
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“BRCA”).  Certain mutations in the BRCA genes correlate with an increased 
risk of breast and ovarian cancer.55 
The University of Pennsylvania Genetic Diagnostic Laboratory (“GDL”) 
is a state-of-the art facility that provides DNA-based diagnostic testing for a 
variety of genetic diseases.  Since 1995, Arupa Ganguly, Ph.D. and Haig 
Kazazian, Jr., M.D. have served as the co-directors of the GDL.56  In the late 
1990s, Drs. Ganguly and Kazazian were researching BRCA genes and 
providing BRCA testing services to patients.  During this time, Dr. Kazazian 
also received and conducted diagnostic tests on patient samples from other 
doctors, including Harry Ostrer, M.D., Director of the Genetics Laboratory at 
the NYU Langone Medical Center.57 
Beginning in 1998, Drs. Ganguly and Kazazian received a series of letters 
from Myriad.  The first letter, dated May 29, 1998, informed the doctors of 
Myriad’s patents and offered an extremely narrow license.58  Around the same 
time, Dr. Ostrer received a similar letter.  The letter to Dr. Ostrer stated that he 
was “either currently providing diagnostic testing services for BRCA1 or [was] 
interested in initiating such a service.”59  The letter went on to offer Dr. Ostrer 
a license that, like the one offered to Drs. Ganguly and Kazazian, was quite 
limited in scope.60 
On August 26, 1998, Drs. Ganguly and Kazazian received a second letter 
from Myriad.  This letter, sent by Myriad’s attorney, asserted that Dr. 
Kazazian’s commercial testing activities infringed the patents-in-suit and 
demanded that he cease “all infringing activity.”61  Soon thereafter, Myriad 
sued the University of Pennsylvania for patent infringement.62  The suit was 
dismissed without prejudice because the University agreed to cease the 
infringing activity. 
In June and September of 1999, however, the General Counsel at the 
University of Pennsylvania received two more cease-and-desist letters from 
Myriad.  The letters claimed that Dr. Kazazian was continuing to conduct 
infringing tests and demanded that these activities cease.63  Because it feared 
that Myriad would reinstitute the infringement suit, the University compelled 
Drs. Ganguly and Kazazian to cease all BRCA testing for either research or 
 
55. Complaint at ¶¶ 1–4, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO (Myriad), 653 F.3d 1329 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011).  (No. 09-4515).   
56. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO (Myriad), 669 F. Supp. 2d 365, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009) (denying defendants motion to dismiss). 
57. Declaration of Harry Ostrer, M.D., 1:09-cv-04515-RWS (Aug. 26, 2009) (“Ostrer Decl.”), 
¶ 5.   
58. Declaration of Arupa Ganguly, PhD, 1:09-cv-04515-RWS, Doc. 85 (Aug. 18, 2009) 
(“Ganguly Decl.”), ¶ 5, Ex. 2. 
59. Ostrer Decl., ¶ 7, Ex. 2. 
60. Id. 
61. Ganguly Decl.,¶ 6, Ex. 3. 
62. Myriad Genetics v. Univ. of Penn., Case No. 2:98-cv-829 (D. Utah 1998). 
63. Ganguly Decl., ¶¶ 7, 9 and Exs. 4, 6. 
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clinical purposes.64  The GDL also was precluded from accepting samples from 
other institutions or individual doctors because Myriad contended that such 
activities were infringing.65 
In addition to the activities outlined above regarding the GDL, Myriad has 
engaged in other threatening conduct with respect to its BRCA patents.  Myriad 
has sent cease-and-desist letters to other institutions;66 it has informed the 
director of the Yale DNA Diagnostics Laboratory that certain contemplated 
testing would infringe Myriad’s patents;67 and it has filed lawsuits regarding its 
BRCA patents.68  It is widely understood among those in the field of genetics 
research that Myriad will vigorously enforce its rights with respect to the 
BRCA patents.69 
No doubt Myriad’s pattern of behavior has had a “chilling effect” on the 
industry.70  In light of GDL’s experience, Myriad’s competitors have decided 
not to offer BRCA-related testing services.71  Yet many have indicated that 
they would consider beginning (or, in the case of GDL, resuming) BRCA 
testing if Myriad’s patents were to be invalidated.  Dr. Ostrer, for example, 
stated that “[i]f the patents were invalidated, I would immediately take steps to 
begin clinical sequencing of the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes.”72  Though a bit 
more tentative, Dr. Ganguly also indicated her earnest desire to “immediately 
consider resuming BRCA testing in [her] laboratory.”73  Significantly, both 
Drs. Ganguly and Ostrer declare that they have the capability and resources to 
begin BRCA testing immediately. 
B. Procedural Background 
On May 12, 2009, twenty plaintiffs represented by the ACLU and the 
Public Patent Foundation filed a declaratory judgment action in the U.S. 
District Court for the Southern District of New York against Myriad Genetics.74  
Plaintiffs included various medical organizations, genetics researchers, 
clinicians, and cancer patients.  Among other things, plaintiffs sought a 
 
64. Id., ¶ 10. 
65. Ostrer Decl., ¶ 5. 
66. Order Denying Mot. to Dismiss, 31–32, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO 
(Myriad), 653 F.3d 1329 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 09-4515). 
67. Id. at 32–33. 
68. Myriad Genetics v. Oncormed, Case No. 2:98-cv-35 (D. Utah 1998); Myriad Genetics v. 
Oncormed, Case No. 2:97-cv-922 (D. Utah 1997). 
69. Order Denying Mot. to Dismiss, 32–33, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO 
(Myriad), 653 F.3d 1329 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 09-4515).   
70. Ostrer Decl., ¶ 6. 
71. Id. 
72. Id., ¶ 8. 
73. Ganguly Decl., ¶ 14. 
74. Plaintiffs also sued the United States Patent and Trademark Office asserting certain 
constitutional claims.  See Complaint, ¶¶ 102–03, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO (Myriad), 
653 F.3d 1329 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 09-4515).  Those claims are not addressed in this Essay, 
however, because they were dismissed by the district court and are not at issue on appeal. 
2011] STANDING TO SUE 79 
declaration that certain claims of Myriad’s patents related to the BRCA gene 
were invalid because human genes, as products of nature, are not patentable 
subject matter.75 
Defendants moved to dismiss the case on the ground that, inter alia, 
plaintiffs lacked standing because Myriad had failed to take sufficient 
affirmative acts to create a justiciable controversy. On November 1, 2009, the 
district court issued an order denying defendants’ motion to dismiss.  The court 
held that, under the MedImmune test, all twenty plaintiffs had alleged sufficient 
facts to support standing.  Importantly, in reaching this decision, the court held 
that although patent holders must take some affirmative acts to create an Article 
III case or controversy, there is no “general rule that [those] actions [must be] 
directed towards the plaintiff” as opposed to a third party.76 
Having denied defendants’ motion to dismiss, the court turned to the 
parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment.  On March 29, 2010, the court 
issued a 156-page opinion that granted summary judgment to plaintiffs with 
respect to their invalidity claims.  The court declared, specifically, that the 
patents were invalid because they are “directed to a law of nature.”77 
Myriad appealed the decision to the Federal Circuit, and approximately 
forty amicus briefs were filed with the court.  The amici included medical and 
health organizations, pharmaceutical companies, intellectual property 
associations, and academics.  Additionally, the United States Department of 
Justice (“DOJ”) filed an amicus brief arguing that some types of genes are 
patentable, while others are not.78  The DOJ’s role in the Myriad case is 
remarkable for two reasons.  First, the DOJ’s position contradicts the broader 
view of gene patentability long held by other arms of the federal government, 
namely the Patent and Trademark Office and the National Institutes of Health.79  
Second, in an unprecedented move, the acting Solicitor General of the United 
States, Neal Katyal, wrote to the Federal Circuit and requested that the Myriad 
oral argument be scheduled for a certain date so that he could appear personally 
to argue on behalf of the United States.80 
Per Mr. Katyal’s request, the Federal Circuit heard oral arguments in 
Myriad on April 4, 2011.  The panel included Judges Lourie, Bryson, and 
Moore.  Because scholars, amici, and the media had fixed on the substantive 
 
75. Id. at ¶ 102. 
76. Order Denying Mot. to Dismiss, 55 n.14, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO 
(Myriad), 653 F.3d 1329 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 09-4515).   
77. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO (Myriad), 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 237 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010) (granting plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment).  
78. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Case No. 2010-
1406 (Oct. 29, 2010), http://patentdocs.typepad.com/files/united-states-amicus-brief-1.pdf.   
79. See, e.g., Turna Ray, U.S. DOJ Argues Against Patenting Isolated Genes, But USPTO Will 
Maintain Status Quo (Nov. 3, 2010), http://www.genomeweb.com/dxpgx/us-doj-argues-against-
patenting-isolated-genes-uspto-will-maintain-status-quo?page=show.   
80. Letter from Neal Katyal to Jan Horably, Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit (Feb. 10, 2011), http://patentdocs.typepad.com/files/katyal-letter.pdf.   
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issues in the case, some were surprised that the panel devoted significant time 
to questions concerning justiciability.81  Indeed, when plaintiffs’ counsel 
opened his argument by addressing the merits of the case, Judge Moore asked 
him to begin with standing instead.82  The panel then proceeded to ask the 
parties numerous questions about standing, particularly the impact of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Lujan.  Thus, after oral argument, it was unclear 
whether the court would reach the merits of the case or whether it would 
dismiss the case on justiciability grounds. 
In an interesting twist, on July 27, 2011, Myriad filed a letter “to bring to 
the Court’s attention events occurring since the April 4 [2011] oral argument 
that could have a bearing on the threshold jurisdictional issue presented in [the] 
case.”83  Myriad’s letter explained that Dr. Ostrer was leaving his position at 
NYU to join the Department of Genetics at Albert Einstein College of 
Medicine, which, unlike NYU, “does not offer, and is not qualified to offer, 
clinical genetic testing.”84  Accordingly, Myriad argued, Dr. Ostrer no longer 
has the “capability and desire” to immediately begin sequencing the BRCA 
genes, and thus has no standing to sue. 
Just two days after Myriad filed this letter, the Federal Circuit issued its 
much-anticipated decision in Myriad.  In a divided opinion authored by Judge 
Lourie, the Federal Circuit reversed the lower court’s invalidity determination 
and held that most of Myriad’s BRCA-related gene patents claim subject matter 
eligible for patent protection.85  Before reaching this decision on the merits, the 
court considered the threshold justiciability question and concluded that only 
one of the twenty plaintiffs, Dr. Ostrer, had standing to sue Myriad.86  The 
court’s opinion is conspicuously silent about Dr. Ostrer’s departure from NYU, 
however, suggesting that the letter failed to reach the panel before the decision 
was issued. 
At the end of August, both Myriad and the plaintiffs filed petitions for 
panel rehearing.  Unsurprisingly, Myriad’s petition challenged the court’s 
standing decision for the reasons laid out in its July 27th letter.87  And while the 
 
81. See, e.g., John Conley & Dan Vorhaus, What We Learned from the Myriad Oral Argument, 
GENOMICS LAW REPORT (Apr. 5, 2011), 
http://www.genomicslawreport.com/index.php/2011/04/05/what-we-learned-from-myriad-oral-
argument/. 
82. Oral Argument at 26:21, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO (Myriad), 653 F.3d 
1329 (2011) (No. 2010-1406), available at http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oral-argument-
recordings/2010-1406/alla. (“Mr. Hansen, would you mind starting with standing first?”). 
83. Letter from Gregory A. Castanias to Jan Horbaly, Clerk of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit (July 27, 2011), http://patentdocs.typepad.com/files/myriad-letter.pdf.   
84. Id. 
85. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO (Myriad), 653 F.3d 1329, 1354 (2011). On the 
merits, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court holding that Myriad’s claims directed to isolated 
genes recite patentable subject matter.  Id. at 1334.  However, the Federal Circuit affirmed the lower 
court’s invalidity determination as to some of Myriad’s method claims. Id. 
86. Id. at 1344. 
87. Defendants-Appellants’ Petition for Panel Rehearing, Case No. 2010-1406 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 
29, 2011), http://www.patents4life.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/Myriad-Petition-for-Panel-
2011] STANDING TO SUE 81 
plaintiffs’ petition focused primarily on the merits of the case, they too asked 
the panel to reconsider the question of standing.88  On September 13, 2011, the 
panel denied the plaintiffs’ petition for rehearing, but asked plaintiffs to file a 
response to Myriad’s petition regarding Dr. Ostrer’s recent change of 
circumstances.89  Plaintiffs responded with Dr. Ostrer’s supplemental 
declaration which made clear that Ostrer’s departure from NYU would not 
change any circumstances relevant to the standing analysis.90  Accordingly, the 
Federal Circuit denied Myriad’s petition for panel rehearing as well.91 
The remainder of this Essay critically examines the Federal Circuit’s 
standing analysis in the Myriad case and concludes that it should be 
reconsidered because it contradicts Supreme Court precedent and is unsound 
from a policy perspective.  The Essay argues that a broader interpretation of the 
standing doctrine is warranted – not just in the Myriad case, but in patent 
declaratory judgment actions across the board. 
III. 
THE PANEL’S DECISION IN MYRIAD 
A. The Federal Circuit’s Post-MedImmune Jurisprudence 
In recent years, the Supreme Court has eschewed bright-line rules 
regarding the patent system.92  For example, the Court eliminated the 
presumption that a patent owner who prevailed on infringement was entitled to 
a permanent injunction;93 it rejected the motivation-to-combine test for 
 
Rehearing.pdf.   
88. Plaintiffs-Appellees’ Petition for Panel Rehearing, No. 2010-1406 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 25 
2011).  Plaintiffs argued that the American College of Medical Genetics has organizational standing on 
behalf of its member, Dr. Ostrer.  Id. at 11–12.  They additionally contended that plaintiff Ellen 
Matloff, the Director of the Cancer Genetic Counseling Shared Resource at the Yale Cancer Center, 
has standing because she was informed by Myriad that certain tests Yale geneticists were considering 
undertaking would violate Myriad’s patents.  Id. at 12.  Although both of these arguments appear to 
have merit, it is beyond the scope of this Essay to address them since other plaintiffs plainly satisfied 
the requirements of standing under MedImmune. 
89. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Disposition Sheet (Sept. 12, 2011), 
http://www.genomicslawreport.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/Myriad-Dispositions.pdf.  
90. Plaintiffs-Appellees’ Answer to Defendants-Appellants’ Petition for Panel Rehearing, Case 
No. 2010-1406 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 15, 2011).   
91. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Disposition Sheet (Sept. 12, 2011), 
http://www.genomicslawreport.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/Myriad-Dispositions.pdf. It is true 
that events occurring after the onset of litigation may end the controversy between the parties.  See e.g., 
Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477–78 (1990); Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 
108 (1969).  The question, therefore, was whether the change of circumstances that Dr. Ostrer 
experienced mooted the controversy.  The Myriad panel clearly believed that it did not.    
92. Megan M. La Belle, Patent Litigation, Personal Jurisdiction, and the Public Good, 18 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 43 (2010); Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2 (2010) 
(arguing that the Federal Circuit uses formalistic rules to mitigate the burden on lay judges and juries 
grappling with unfamiliar technologies in patent cases). 
93. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
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obviousness;94 and it held that the “machine-or-transformation” test was not the 
sole test for patentable subject matter.95  In a similar vein, the MedImmune 
Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s two-prong test for standing in patent 
declaratory judgment actions and mandated that courts consider all the 
circumstances instead.96 
Since MedImmune, the Federal Circuit repeatedly has stated that it now 
applies the all the circumstances test, and that it should be easier for plaintiffs 
seeking declaratory relief to establish standing.97  Yet a closer look at post-
MedImmune jurisprudence suggests something different: the Federal Circuit is 
reverting to a bright-line test.  In Prasco, LLC v. Medicis Pharmaceutical 
Corp., for instance, the court breathed new life into the reasonable 
apprehension of suit inquiry holding that it is “one of multiple ways that a 
declaratory judgment plaintiff can satisfy the more general all-the-
circumstances test to establish that an action presents a justiciable Article III 
controversy.”98 
An even more striking example of this regression is Cat Tech LLC v. 
Tubemaster, Inc., in which the Federal Circuit held that, after MedImmune, the 
meaningful preparations prong of its former test remains an “important 
element” in the standing analysis.99  The court did not stop there, however, as it 
went on to explain: 
If a declaratory judgment plaintiff has not taken significant, concrete 
steps to conduct infringing activity, the dispute is neither “immediate” 
nor “real” and the requirements for justiciability have not been met.100 
Thus, in actuality, the court held that the question of meaningful preparations is 
not merely an “important element” of standing, but a requirement.  Simply put, 
the court appears to have reinstated the “meaningful preparations” prong of the 
standing test. 
The Myriad case presented the Federal Circuit with an opportunity to 
reverse this retrogressive trend.  Disappointingly, though, the Myriad panel did 
just the opposite: it has returned the law of standing in patent declaratory 
judgment actions to its status before MedImmune. 
B. The Myriad Court’s Standing Analysis 
In Myriad, the court began its standing analysis by stating that there is no 
bright-line rule for standing.101  The court explained that the question, instead, 
 
94. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
95. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3222 (2009). 
96. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007). 
97. See, e.g., Prasco, LLC v. Medicis Pharmaceutical Corp., 537 F.3d 1329, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 
2008); Cat Tech, LLC v. Tubemaster, Inc., 528 F.3d 871, 880 (Fed. Cir. 2008).    
98. Prasco, 537 F.3d at 1336. 
99. Cat Tech, 528 F.3d at 880.    
100. Id. (emphasis added). 
101. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO (Myriad), 653 F.3d 1329, 1342 (2011).  
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is “whether the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there is a 
substantial controversy between parties having adverse legal interests, of 
sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory 
judgment.”102  The Myriad court further acknowledged that MedImmune 
relaxed the Federal Circuit’s prior test for standing in patent declaratory relief 
suits.103 
It therefore appeared at the outset that Myriad’s standing analysis would 
be faithful to MedImmune; yet, that supposition was not borne out by the rest of 
the opinion.  Despite these pronouncements about the flexible and lenient 
MedImmune standard, in the end the court applied a rigid two-part test.  As the 
court explained: 
[T]o establish an injury in fact traceable to the patentee, a declaratory 
judgment plaintiff must allege both (1) an affirmative act by the 
patentee related to the enforcement of his patent rights, and (2) 
meaningful preparation to conduct potentially infringing activity.104 
This test is strikingly similar to the one utilized by the Federal Circuit before 
MedImmune.105  In fact, the second prong is identical, and the first focuses on 
the patentee’s conduct just like the earlier “reasonable apprehension of suit” 
prong.106  Thus, the panel’s decision in Myriad crystallized what had been 
hinted at in Prasco and Cat Tech: the Federal Circuit has come full circle with 
respect to standing in patent declaratory judgment actions and has returned to 
its pre-MedImmune formalistic approach. 
Applying this bright-line test, the court quickly narrowed the group of 
twenty prospective plaintiffs to only three: Drs. Kazazian, Ganguly, and Ostrer.  
In the court’s view, these were the only plaintiffs who could allege “affirmative 
patent enforcement actions directed at them by Myriad,” namely the cease-and-
desist letters and proposed licensing agreements sent by Myriad in the late 
1990s.107  That is, only Drs. Kazazian, Ganguly, and Ostrer could satisfy the 
first prong of the Federal Circuit’s standing test. 
With respect to the second prong, however, the court determined that only 
Dr. Ostrer had made “meaningful preparation to conduct potentially infringing 
activity.”108  Although Drs. Kazazian, Ganguly, and Ostrer all declared that 
they were capable of performing the BRCA genetic testing, only Dr. Ostrer said 
 
102. Id. at 1343. 
103. Id. at 1344. 
104. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
105. See, e.g., Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 395 F.3d 1324, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 
2005) (describing pre-MedImmune test as “requir[ing] two core elements: (1) acts of defendant 
indicating an intent to enforce its patent; and (2) acts of plaintiff that might subject it or its customers to 
suit for patent infringement.”).   
106. See Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 736 (Fed. Cir. 1988) 
(holding that reasonable apprehension prong of the pre-MedImmune test is satisfied only if defendant’s 
conduct indicates an intent to enforce its patent). 
107. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO (Myriad), 653 F.3d 1329, 1344 (2011). 
108. Id. 
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definitively that he would resume that testing if the patents in suit were 
invalidated.  Drs. Kazazian and Ganguly alleged only that they would 
“consider” resuming BRCA testing, and the Myriad court concluded that such 
“‘some day intentions’ are insufficient to support an actual or imminent injury 
for standing” under Lujan.109  For those reasons, the Federal Circuit reversed 
the district court’s broad holding with respect to standing and held that Dr. 
Ostrer was the only plaintiff who could maintain a declaratory judgment action 
against Myriad. 
Since only one plaintiff has to have standing in order for a case to be 
justiciable,110 then why does it matter if the court’s reasoning was flawed or if 
there were other plaintiffs who also had standing to sue Myriad?  The reasons 
are twofold: first and foremost, the panel’s decision creates bad precedent for 
future patent declaratory relief actions;111 and second, Myriad may raise the 
standing issue in a petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme 
Court.  The next Part of the Essay aims to show that the Federal Circuit 
improperly analyzed justiciability in Myriad, and urges the Supreme Court to 




MYRIAD: A PROPER JUSTICIABILITY ANALYSIS 
A. MedImmune’s All the Circumstances Test Governs Standing in Patent 
Declaratory Judgment Actions 
At the beginning of its opinion, the Myriad panel pronounced that 
MedImmune’s all the circumstances test governs the standing analysis in patent 
declaratory relief actions.  The court then held that, in order to satisfy this test, 
plaintiffs must demonstrate two things: (1) an affirmative act by the patentee 
related to the enforcement of the patent rights; and (2) meaningful preparation 
by the plaintiff to conduct potentially infringing activity.112  In other words, the 
Myriad panel gave lip service to the  MedImmune standard, but then applied 
precisely the type of bright line rule eschewed by the Supreme Court just a few 
years ago. 
MedImmune provides that the question of standing depends on “whether 
 
109. Id. at 1346. 
110. Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497, 518 (2007) (“Only one of the petitioners needs to 
have standing to permit us to consider the petition for review.”). 
111. Indeed, the impact of Myriad is quickly becoming clear.  Two published district court 
opinions have considered Myriad in addressing the question of standing in patent declaratory judgment 
cases.  See Proofpoint, Inc. v. Innova Patent Licensing, LLC, 2011 WL 4915847, *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 
17, 2011); JIA Jewelry Importers of Am., Inc. v. Pandora Jewelry, LLC, 2011 WL 4566118, *1 (D. 
Md. Sept. 29, 2011).  Unsurprisingly, both courts held that plaintiffs failed to satisfy Myriad’s bright-
line rule, and therefore dismissed their declaratory judgment actions on justiciability grounds.  
112. Myriad, 653 F.3d at 1343. 
2011] STANDING TO SUE 85 
the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there is a substantial 
controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient 
immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.”113  
The Supreme Court intentionally crafted this test so that it would be easier for 
alleged infringers to demonstrate standing.114  Why?  Because when private 
parties invalidate bad patents the public as a whole benefits from robust 
competition, increased consumer choice, and lower prices.115  And often, 
declaratory relief is the only channel available for challenging potentially 
invalid patents. 
While patent litigation certainly implicates private interests, the public is 
the primary intended beneficiary of our patent system.  Courts, including the 
Federal Circuit, have recognized this for years.116  Indeed, Judge Moore, one of 
the panelists in Myriad, stated the following in a recent case: 
In a patent case, especially where a patent has been invalidated, the 
public interest is overwhelming . . .  [P]atents are public rather than 
private rights . . . .117 
Yet, in the context of patent declaratory judgment actions, the Federal 
Circuit consistently seems more concerned with the plight of patent owners 
than with the threat that potentially bad patents pose to the public.118  At the 
oral argument in Myriad, Judge Moore expressed serious skepticism about the 
breadth of the district court’s standing analysis.  Judge Moore was particularly 
troubled by the court’s decision to afford standing to the patient plaintiffs: 
[T]o reach individual people who want cheaper access to products 
 
113. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007). 
114. See, e.g., Myriad, 653 F.3d at 1344 (“MedImmune relaxed this court’s more restrictive 
‘reasonable apprehension of suit’ test for declaratory judgment jurisdiction.”); Micron Tech., Inc. v. 
Mosaid Techs., Inc., 518 F.3d 897, 902 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[T]he now more lenient legal standard 
facilitates or enhances the availability of declaratory judgment jurisdiction in patent cases.”).     
115. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969) (explaining the importance of validity 
challenges in light of the “public interest in permitting full and free competition in the use of ideas 
which are in reality a part of the public domain”); Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive 
Maintenance Machinery Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945) (“The far-reaching social and economic 
consequences of a patent . . . give the public a paramount interest in seeing that patent monopolies 
spring from backgrounds free from fraud or other inequitable conduct and that such monopolies are 
kept within their legitimate scope.”). 
116. See, e.g., United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 278 (1942) (“[T]he promotion of 
the progress of science and the useful arts is the main object; reward of inventors is secondary and 
merely a means to that end.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 
1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“‘The basic quid pro quo contemplated by the Constitution and the Congress 
for granting a patent monopoly is the benefit derived by the public from an invention with substantial 
utility.’”) (quoting Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 535–36 (1966));  Frischer & Co. v. Bakelite 
Corp., 39 F.2d 247, 267 (C.C.P.A. 1930) (“The essential purpose of our patent system is to benefit the 
public by encouraging the genius and wit of men to develop new and useful things for mankind’s 
benefit and enjoyment . . . .”). 
117. Ohio Willow Wood Co. v. Thermo-Ply, Inc., 629 F.3d 1374, 1376 (2011) (Moore, J., 
concurring). 
118. See La Belle, supra note 92, at 47–48 (arguing that the Federal Circuit has consistently 
adopted personal jurisdiction standards that make it more difficult for alleged infringers to sue for 
declaratory relief). 
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seems to me . . . so broad as to allow any person that wants a cheaper 
product in any case to sue. . . . Apple and Microsoft and everybody 
else would be sued by every consumer out there.119 
And she seemed equally unconvinced by plaintiffs’ argument that potential 
competitors should have standing to sue Myriad: 
Do you not recognize the profound impact that would have on our 
patent system if anyone who was ready, willing, and able to compete 
tomorrow could bring a [declaratory judgment] action against the 
patentee in any forum of their choosing without any affirmative act 
directed at all towards them by the patentee?120 
The question of whether potential competitors and consumers should have 
standing to seek declaratory relief in patent cases is complex and provocative.  
It was unnecessary for the Myriad court to resolve this question since there 
were other plaintiffs – namely Drs. Kazazian, Ganguly, and Ostrer – whose 
arguments for standing were stronger.  But this issue is sure to arise in future 
cases, especially now that public interest organizations like the ACLU and the 
Public Patent Foundation are using declaratory relief to challenge potentially 
invalid patents.121  It is true that allowing such suits could negatively impact 
patent owners as Judge Moore suggested at the Myriad oral argument.  What 
courts must remember, however, is that it is public rights – not private rights – 
that are of paramount importance in our patent system.  A patent is a private 
privilege; yet it is a privilege that is “conditioned by a public purpose.”122 
It was this public purpose – as well as a desire to improve accuracy and 
bring patent jurisprudence in line with other areas of the law – that led the 
Supreme Court to mandate a holistic approach to standing in patent declaratory 
judgment actions.  Yet, just a few years after MedImmune, the Federal Circuit’s 
inclination toward formalism has once again caused it to adopt a bright line 
rule.  Had the Federal Circuit analyzed standing in Myriad under the proper 
standard, the result surely would have been different. 
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B. Drs. Ganguly, Kazazian, and Ostrer All Have Standing Under 
MedImmune’s All the Circumstances Test 
While it is beyond the scope of this Essay to discuss all of the facts 
relevant to standing, this Part highlights the most significant evidence, and 
demonstrates that Drs. Ganguly, Kazazian, and Ostrer all had standing to sue 
Myriad.  First, Drs. Ganguly, Kazazian, and Ostrer were all engaged in BRCA-
related activity in the late 1990s, and all three were forced to cease that activity 
due to Myriad’s conduct.  After offering Drs. Ganguly, Kazazian, and Ostrer 
licenses that were far too narrow, Myriad sent several cease-and-desist letters 
and then sued the University of Pennsylvania for patent infringement.  As a 
consequence, Drs. Ganguly and Kazazian stopped all BRCA activity, and Dr. 
Ostrer stopped providing samples to the GDL for testing. 
Second, there is significant evidence in the record that it is widely 
understood in the industry that Myriad vigorously enforces its BRCA 
patents.123  Myriad has sent threatening letters to competitors other than the 
University of Pennsylvania.  It has also refused to allow certain laboratories, 
like the Yale DNA Diagnostics Laboratory, to undertake BRCA testing.124  
This type of conduct is an important consideration in the standing analysis.125 
Finally, Myriad has refused to provide plaintiffs with a covenant not to 
sue.  As the Federal Circuit recently held, “a patentee’s refusal to give 
assurances that it will not enforce its patent is relevant to the determination of 
declaratory judgment standing.”126  And at oral argument Judge Moore 
acknowledged that the refusal to provide a covenant not to sue is particularly 
germane in this case “where there has been an actual threat [and] an actual 
modification of behavior.”127 
Despite this wealth of evidence, the Federal Circuit concluded that Drs. 
Ganguly and Kazazian lacked standing because they did not allege a 
controversy of sufficient reality and immediacy as required by Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife.128  Following a brief synopsis of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Lujan, the Essay argues that the Myriad panel misinterpreted Lujan 
and failed to recognize the factual differences between the two cases. 
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C. Lujan Does Not Bar Standing In Myriad Genetics 
1. The Lujan Decision 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, one of the seminal Supreme Court cases on 
standing, arose under section 7(a) of the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) of 
1973.129  That section of the Act requires federal agencies to consult with the 
Secretary of the Interior whenever they propose an action that may affect 
endangered or threatened species.  In 1978, the Secretary of the Interior 
promulgated a regulation stating that the obligations imposed by section 7(a) 
extend to actions taken abroad.  A year later, however, Interior reversed its 
position and revised the regulation to require consultation only for actions 
taken in the United States or on the high seas.130 
In Lujan, the Defenders of Wildlife and two other environmental 
organizations sued Manuel Lujan, the Secretary of the Interior, challenging the 
revised regulation.  Plaintiffs sued pursuant to the “citizen suit” provision of the 
ESA.  That provision allows any person to “commence a civil suit on his own 
behalf to enjoin any person, including the United States and any other 
governmental instrumentality or agency . . . who is alleged to be in violation of 
any provision of this chapter.”131 
Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that the revised regulation 
misinterprets section 7(a), and an injunction that would require Interior to 
restore the original interpretation of the statute.  Lujan moved to dismiss on 
standing grounds.  In support of standing, plaintiffs submitted affidavits from 
Joyce Kelly and Amy Skilbred, both to prove that plaintiffs would be injured if 
section 7(a) of the ESA did not to apply to endangered species abroad. 
In her affidavit, Kelly stated that she had visited Egypt in 1986 and 
“observed the traditional habitat of the endangered Nile crocodile there and 
intend[ed] to do so again, and hope[d] to observe the crocodile directly.”132  
Kelly further declared that she would “suffer harm in fact as the result of the 
American role in overseeing the rehabilitation of the Aswan High Dam on the 
Nile and in developing Egypt’s Master Water Plan.”133  Similarly, Skilbred 
averred in her affidavit that she was in Sri Lanka in 1981 and “observed the 
habitat . . . of the Asian elephant and the leopard” on the site of the Mahaweli 
Project, a development project in which the United States was involved.134  
Skilbred explained that this project threatened endangered species in the area, 
which harmed her since she “intend[ed] to return to Sri Lanka in the future.”135 
After considering the evidence, the district court granted defendant’s 
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motion to dismiss for lack of standing.  The Eighth Circuit reversed and, after 
remand, the case eventually made its way to the Supreme Court. 
The Lujan Court announced that “the irreducible constitutional minimum 
of standing contains three elements.”136  First, the plaintiff must have suffered, 
or been threatened with, an injury-in-fact.  An injury-in-fact is a concrete and 
particularized invasion of a legally protected interest; it must be “actual or 
imminent,” as opposed to “conjectural or hypothetical.”137  Second, there must 
be a causal connection between the injury and the defendant’s conduct, 
meaning at least some portion of the plaintiff’s injury is “fairly traceable” to the 
defendant and not to a third party.138  Lastly, it must be likely that the relief 
requested will redress the plaintiff’s injury.139  Applying this test, the Supreme 
Court held by a vote of seven to two that there was no standing because 
plaintiffs failed to demonstrate an injury-in-fact. 
With respect to the injury-in-fact prong, the Court determined that 
plaintiffs failed to show how damage to the endangered species would produce 
an “imminent” injury to Kelly and Skilbred.  According to the Court, 
[T]he affiants’ profession of an “intent” to return to the places they had 
visited before – where they will presumably, this time, be deprived of 
the opportunity to observe animals of the endangered species – is 
simply not enough.  Such “some day” intentions – without any 
description of concrete plans, or indeed even any specification of when 
the some day will be – do not support a finding of the “actual or 
imminent” injury that our cases require.140 
What is clear from Lujan is that this injury-in-fact analysis was shaped by 
separation of powers principles.  Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, 
proclaimed that the core purpose of the standing doctrine was to safeguard the 
separation of powers by limiting the circumstances in which courts may hear 
cases.141  Separation of powers concerns are particularly implicated by citizen 
suits where, as in Lujan, Congress has bestowed on private individuals the right 
to sue to vindicate some public interest.  The fear is that creating a private right 
of action permits Congress to transfer from the executive branch to the judicial 
branch the President’s most important constitutional duty: to “take Care that the 
Laws be faithfully executed.”142  Lujan therefore held that plaintiffs could not 
establish an injury-in-fact solely through the citizen suit provision of the ESA. 
In the face of this evidence, a majority of the Lujan Court concluded that 
plaintiffs could not satisfy the injury-in-fact prong of the standing test.  To be 
sure, the correctness of the Lujan decision has been the subject of much 
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debate.143  That debate is of no moment to this Essay, however, because a 
proper interpretation of Lujan proves that it is easily distinguished from 
Myriad. 
2. Myriad is Distinguishable from Lujan 
The Myriad panel held that Drs. Ganguly and Kazazian, unlike Dr. Ostrer, 
had not suffered an injury-in-fact because their injuries were not “actual or 
imminent” under Lujan.  The panel drew a distinction between Dr. Ostrer, who 
declared that he would immediately resume BRCA testing if the patents in suit 
were invalidated, and Drs. Ganguly and Kazazian, who indicated that they 
would consider resuming such testing.  The panel analogized the statements of 
Drs. Ganguly and Kazazian to the “‘some day’ intentions” of plaintiffs Kelly 
and Skilbred in the Lujan case, and then concluded that such “some day” 
intentions are insufficient to support standing.144 But a close reading of Lujan 
suggests that the Myriad court misinterpreted the injury-in-fact requirement. 
Lujan provides that an injury-in-fact must be “actual or imminent.”145  
Yet, the Federal Circuit in Myriad appeared to require plaintiffs’ injuries to be 
actual and imminent: 
In contrast to Ostrer, who alleges an actual and imminent injury for 
purposes of standing, Drs. Kazazian and Ganguly allege only that they 
will ‘consider’ resuming BRCA testing.”146 
This misreading of Lujan’s imminence requirement led the Myriad court to the 
wrong result on the question of standing. 
In Lujan the Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs had suffered neither an 
actual nor imminent injury, and thus could not demonstrate the requisite injury-
in-fact.  The plaintiff environmental groups in Lujan relied on standing 
declarations from environmental group members who had suffered no injury at 
the time of filing suit.  The affiants, Joyce Kelly and Amy Skilbred, claimed 
only that they would be injured as a result of the challenged projects in Egypt 
and Sri Lanka, which would harm certain endangered species that the affiants 
enjoyed viewing; but they offered no evidence that those projects had already 
impacted the endangered species in question.  In short, the complaint in Lujan 
alleged no actual injury and so the only question was whether the plaintiffs 
would suffer imminent harm. 
The same cannot be said for Myriad, however.  Some of the plaintiffs in 
Myriad – namely Drs. Ganguly, Kazazian, and Ostrer – had already been 
injured at the time the lawsuit was filed.  In the late 1990s, all three of these 
plaintiffs were engaged in BRCA-related activities: Dr. Ganguly was 
conducting BRCA research; Dr. Kazazian was providing BRCA testing 
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services to patients; and Dr. Ostrer was supplying Dr. Kazazian with patient 
samples for testing.  But all three plaintiffs were forced to cease their activities 
as a result of Myriad’s threats to enforce its BRCA patents against them and its 
filing of an actual lawsuit.  Consequently, plaintiffs suffered an actual injury-
in-fact. 
The plaintiffs in Myriad, unlike in Lujan, suffered a past injury.  It is well 
settled that past wrongs are evidence bearing on the question “whether there is 
a real and immediate threat of repeated injury.”147 Yet, the analysis does not 
end there.  The Supreme Court stated in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons that past 
injury is not necessarily sufficient to establish standing for prospective relief.148  
Because the plaintiffs in Myriad sought prospective relief in the form of a 
declaration of rights, Lyons also should have been considered. 
The plaintiff in Lyons was stopped by a member of the Los Angeles 
Police Department (“LAPD”) for a traffic violation, and then subjected to a 
life-threatening chokehold.  Lyons filed a federal civil rights action against the 
city alleging that LAPD had a policy of using this chokehold, and that the 
chokehold had caused the death of sixteen people in the past eight years.149  
Lyons sought the following relief: (i) damages for the injury he sustained when 
subjected to the chokehold; (ii) a declaration that “use of the chokehold absent 
the threat of immediate use of deadly force is a per se violation of various 
constitutional rights”; and (iii) an injunction that would preclude the LAPD 
from using the chokehold except in very limited circumstances.150 
While there was little doubt that Lyons had standing to sue for past 
damages based on the injuries he sustained from the chokehold, the city 
challenged his standing to sue for prospective relief.  In deciding that question, 
the Supreme Court embraced the concept of “remedial standing,”151 meaning a 
standing analysis that depends on the remedy sought.152  As the Court 
explained, “past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present 
case or controversy regarding injunctive relief” unless the past injury is 
“[]accompanied by . . . continuing, present adverse effects.”153  Stated more 
simply, plaintiffs suffering from continuing injuries have standing to sue for 
prospective relief, while plaintiffs with purely past injuries do not. 
Applying this remedial standing test, the Court allowed Lyons’ suit for 
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damages, but held that he lacked standing to sue for prospective relief.  In the 
Court’s view, there was no actual or present injury because, by the time Lyons 
filed suit, he no longer suffered any continuing injury that equitable relief could 
redress.  What is more, there was no imminent injury since Lyons’ assertion 
that he may again be subject to an illegal chokehold at some point in the future 
was “no more than speculation.”154  In the end, the Lyons Court held that the 
potential threat of future injury was not sufficiently likely to warrant standing 
for prospective relief. 
The facts of Myriad are distinguishable from both Lujan and Lyons 
because Drs. Ganguly, Kazazian, and Ostrer each suffered a past injury that is 
“[]accompanied by . . . continuing, present adverse effects.”155 Plaintiffs’ 
affidavits demonstrate this continuing injury: (i) Drs. Ganguly, Kazazian, and 
Ostrer were engaged in BRCA-related activity; (ii) they were forced to stop 
those activities because Myriad sued them for infringement; (iii) they remain 
interested in pursuing BRCA activities; and (iv) they have refrained from doing 
so because of Myriad’s continued threat to enforce its potentially invalid 
patents.  Indeed, Judge Moore acknowledged this continuing threat at oral 
argument when discussing the cease-and-desist letters sent to Drs. Ganguly and 
Kazazian in the late 1990s: 
I’m looking at it as [Drs. Ganguly and Kazazian are] very much 
laboring under the continued threat of Myriad.  The fact that Myriad 
sent cease and desist ten years ago, twelve years ago, well they did.  
What reason do [Drs. Ganguly and Kazazian] have to think that 
Myriad is not still feeling very much the same way?  I mean, Myriad 
had the power and authority to modify it if [Myriad was] no longer 
feeling that way.  [Myriad] could’ve let the plaintiffs know, [Myriad] 
could’ve offered a covenant not to sue.  But Myriad has declined to do 
so.156 
That the plaintiffs in Myriad suffered from past and continuing injuries 
renders Lujan wholly inapplicable.157  The only injury at issue in Lujan was a 
future – or imminent – injury, so it arguably made sense for the Court to 
impose a heightened injury-in-fact requirement.  In other words, Lujan’s 
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language regarding “some day intentions” applies only to future injuries.158  
And in Myriad the injury was not in the future; it was continuing and 
“actual . . . not conjectural or hypothetical.”159  Plaintiffs were not merely 
complaining of “possible future injur[ies];”160 they described in detail repeated 
past injuries and continuing harm that adequately established an injury-in-
fact.161 
CONCLUSION 
While all patent litigation implicates the public interest, Myriad is a 
particularly high-stakes case with potentially far reaching consequences for 
society.  The substantive questions posed by Myriad – Are genes patentable 
subject matter?  How do gene patents impact medical research and health care?  
Do gene patents promote innovation as required by the Constitution? – are 
critically important and should be addressed by the courts “sooner rather than 
later,” as Justice Breyer has opined.162  Indeed, this point is made especially 
poignant by the Supreme Court’s recent decision to review Mayo Collaborative 
Services v. Prometheus Laboraties, Inc.,163 another Federal Circuit case 
concerning patentable subject matter. 
Yet, in order to reach the merits of Myriad and cases like it, courts must 
first satisfy themselves with respect to justiciability.  In doing so, courts must 
be mindful of the essentiality of declaratory relief to a well-functioning patent 
system.  Under our current system, litigation is the primary gatekeeper of patent 
quality.  Patent quality is commonly raised as an affirmative defense to a patent 
infringement claim.  But if a patent owner does not sue for infringement, then 
often the only way to challenge a potentially invalid patent is through a 
declaratory judgment action. 
Because invalid patents have such a profound impact on competition, 
consumers, and the patent system as a whole, the ability to challenge such 
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patents is vital to the public interest.164  Time and again, the Supreme Court has 
adopted legal standards that facilitate declaratory relief actions.165 After 
Myriad, it seems the Supreme Court needs to remind the Federal Circuit of its 
obligation to the public when considering patent declaratory judgment actions. 
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